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Introduction
Competition law is a relatively new field in the Middle
Eastern region.1 Negotiations pertaining to the adoption
of competition law in Egypt commenced during the mid
1990s. It was not until February 15, 2005 that Law 3 of
2005 promulgating the Law on Protection of Competition
and Prohibition ofMonopolistic Practices (“Law 3/2005”)
was issued.2 This was followed by the issuance of Prime
Ministerial Decree 1316 of 2005 issuing the Executive
Regulations of Protection of Competition and Prohibition
of Monopolistic Practices Law 3 of 2005 (“Executive
Regulations”) on August 16, 2005.3
Determining the investigative powers granted to
competition authorities pertaining to enforcement of the
law is a concern of paramount importance to any
company. It is vital to understand the rights and
obligations of the competition authority vis-à-vis the
company subject to analysis—for instance, the authority’s
right tomake unannounced visits to a company’s premises
and inspect them and the situation with respect to the
documents in the possession of its in-house legal
department and external consultant(s).
Unlike competition law regimes such as that of the
European Union,4 neither Law 3/2005 nor its Executive
Regulations adequately regulate this matter. Moreover,
the Egyptian Competition Authority (“the Authority”)5
did not adopt any guidelines in this respect, nor has it
provided any clarification as to how it intends to enforce
the law and its Executive Regulations.6 Apart from the
necessary guidelines and cases addressing this particular
matter, the system lacks the relevant literature, whether
it is from an academic perspective or a practitioner’s one;
all of which combine and add to the importance of the
present article.
The aim of this article is to explore the Authority’s
investigation powers vis-à-vis companies under scrutiny
pursuant to Law 3/2005, its Executive Regulations and
other relevant laws and regulations. The article will start
off by defining the status of the Authority’s employees
as judicial enforcement officers (“JEOs”) under the
relevant Egyptian laws and regulations. It will then move
on to explore the powers granted to JEOs while applying
them in the field of competition law. The article will then
determine whether or not the documents and
correspondences between a given company and its
in-house legal department and external consultant(s) are
legally privileged.
Investigative powers of the Egyptian
Competition Authority
The investigative powers of the Authority are regulated
under the Law 3/2005 and its Executive Regulations.
However, while the rules stipulated therein do not provide
a sufficient understanding, the author believes that they
should be read in conjunction with Law 17 of 1983
issuing the Law on Bar Association Law (“BAL”), Law
150 of 1950 issuing the Law on Criminal Procedures
(“CPL”) and the General Instructions for Prosecution
Offices (“Al-Taalemat Al-Ama Lil-Niyabat”) of 2002
(“GIPO”).7 For illustration purposes, this article will refer
to some of the Court of Cassation’s judgments.
*mfkg20@sussex.ac.uk. DPhil student, University of Sussex, UK; former public prosecutor, Egypt. The views expressed in this article are personal. The author would like
to thank Malcolm Ross, Professor of European Law, University of Sussex for his valuable comments on an earlier draft. The author is also grateful to Dr Khalid Attia,
former Executive Director, Egyptian Competition Authority, for providing clarifications on some matters in relation to the general criminal rules and Law 3/2005.
1 For general but notable literature on competition law in this region, see M.M. Dabbah, Competition Law and Policy in the Middle East, 1st edn (Cambridge University
Press, 2007).
2 See Official Gazette No.6 (Bis) (February 15, 2005). Note that art.4 of Law 3/2005 provides that such law shall come into force after three months of its publication. This
means that Law 3/2005 came into force on May 16, 2005.
3 See Official Gazette No.32 (Bis) (August 17, 2005). Note that art.2 of the Executive Regulations provides such that the Decree issuing these regulations shall come into
force on the day following its publication. This means that the executive regulations came into force on August 18, 2005.
4Note that this does not encompass only the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union itself; but includes Council Regulations, Commission Regulations and case
law.
5Note that the authority’s board of directors was formed on August 20, 2005 by virtue of Prime Ministerial Decree 1342 of 2005.
6For instance, in its report on the cement market, the authority did not go into much detail in respect of the enforcement procedure. See report of the Egyptian Competition
Authority, Study on the Cement Market in the Arab Republic of Egypt in light of the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices (study
by virtue of the Minister of Trade and Industry’s request dated July 16, 2006 [report in Arabic], published September 5, 2008, available at http://www.eca.org.eg/ECA
/Publication/List.aspx?CategoryID=1 [Accessed September 1, 2010]). For a much more recent evidence on this, see report of the Egyptian Competition Authority, Study
on the justifications behind the increase in prices of Steel Rebars in the Egyptian Market in light of the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic
Practices (study by virtue of the Minister of Trade and Industry’s request dated July 16, 2006 [report in Arabic], published on June 18, 2009, available at http://www.eca
.org.eg/ECA/Resolution/List.aspx?CategoryID=2 [Accessed September 1, 2010); report of the Egyptian Competition Authority, Study determining whether the Egyptian
Market of imported and domestically producedMeat involves any anti-competitive practices in light of the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic
Practices (study by virtue of the Minister of Trade and Industry’s request dated December 26, 2007 [report in Arabic], published on August 31, 2009, available at http:/
/www.eca.org.eg/ECA/Publication/List.aspx?CategoryID=1 [Accessed September 1, 2010]).
7Note that provisions of the BAL, CPL, GIPO, Penal Law and the Egyptian Constitution incorporated in this article were translated on an unofficial basis by the author.
For Arabic readers, you may wish to consult the Arabic versions should you encounter any confusion.
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The status of judicial enforcement officers
(“Sifat Maamour El-Dabt Al-Qadaii”)
Law 3/2005 and its Executive Regulations grant some of
the Authority’s employees the status of JEOs in respect
of its application. Article 17 of Law 3/2005 sets forth the
Authority’s employees who are empowered to enforce
the rules of the law:
“[T]he employees of the authority, who shall be
specified by virtue of a decree issued by theMinister
of Justice, in agreement with the Competent
Minister8 and upon the recommendation of the
Board, shall be granted the status of judicial
enforcement officers in applying the provisions of
this law. Such employees shall have the right to
review records and documents, as well as obtain any
information or data from any governmental or
non-governmental authority for the purpose of
handling cases submitted to the authority.”9
Article 23(b) of the CPL conforms to art.17. It provides
that:
“[T]he Minister of Justice, in agreement with the
Competent Minister, shall grant some employees
the status of judicial enforcement officers with
respect to the contraventions committed within their
competency and in relation to their field of work.
The provisions stipulated in different laws, protocols
and decrees granting some employees the
competency of judicial enforcement officers shall
amount to decrees issued by the Minister of Justice,
in agreement with the Competent Minister.”10
In application of the aforementioned, the Minister of
Justice issued Decree 8483 of 2006 granting some
employees of the Authority the status of JEOs. Article 1
of the Decree of the Minister of Justice identifies the
Authority’s employees who are granted the status of JEOs
in respect of contraventions to the Law 3/2005
(“Authority’s JEOs”) as follows:
• Executive Director of the Authority;
• managers of both the legal and economic
departments of the Authority;
• legal researchers of the Authority;
• economic researchers of the Authority; and
• information-technology specialists.11
However, neither Law 3/2005 nor its Executive
Regulations define the status of JEOs. This status is
originally regulated under the CPL and further elaborated
in the GIPO. Although these sources are addressed therein
from a criminal-law perspective, as such matter is not
regulated under civil or commercial laws, it may be able
to apply some of these rules on the enforcement of
competition rules.
Article 21 of the CPL briefly defines the role of JEOs
as that which pertains to the examination of
(competition-law) contraventions and their contraveners
as well as gathering evidence necessary to undergo an
investigation in a given case.12 While this definition
appears to be a very general one, Law 3/2005 and its
Executive Regulations have gone further in terms of
JEOs’ role and powers.
The powers of judicial enforcement officers
Inspection of the company’s premises
Article 11(1) of Law 3/2005 grants the Authority the
powers to, “receive requests for inquiry, inspection,
collect information or issue orders to initiate such actions
in relation to anti-competitive agreements and practices”.13
While, as it appears, besides not much different than
art.21 of the CPL, art.11(1) is merely an abstract statement
of the role and powers, it is advisable to focus more on
the Executive Regulations for a more detailed elaboration.
Article 38 of the Executive Regulations provides that:
“[E]mployees of the authority who have been
granted the status of judicial enforcement officers,
shall, upon identifying themselves to the concerned
parties, carry out the following procedures:
1. Review books and documents, as well as
obtain all necessary information and data
from any governmental or
8The competent Minister is the Minister of Trade and Industry, pursuant to Prime Ministerial Decree 571 of 2006.
9Law 3 of 2005 Promulgating the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices art.17. Note that art.26(d) of the Executive Regulations,
addressing the same aspect, states that: “[T]he Board of Directors shall be responsible for the following: … (d) recommending the names of the employees who shall be
granted the status of judicial enforcement officers in applying the provisions of the law, who shall be specified by virtue of a decree issued by the Minister of Justice in
agreement with the Competent Minister.” Article 62 of the GIPO mentions that there are two types of JEOs: first, officers who have a general jurisdiction towards all types
of contraventions; and secondly, officers to whom their jurisdiction is limited to certain contraventions. One may observe that, in practice, the authority’s employees lie in
the second category of officers. This is because the authority’s employees concerned are only assigned to detect and capture competition law contraventions (i.e. “certain
contraventions” within the meaning specified in art.62).
10Law 150 of 1950 issuing the Law on Criminal Procedures art.23(b) para.2 Ch.1: Employees having the status of Judicial Enforcement Officers and their Duties.
11Decree of the Minister of Justice 8483 of 2006 granting some of the employees of the Authority for Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices
the status of Judicial Enforcement Officers, Ministry of Justice, Office of the Minister, issued on November 5, 2006.
It is vital to note that it is by no means permitted to any of the authority’s employees who have not been granted the status of JEOs to carry out inspections; whether to the
company’s premises or premises external to that of the company under investigation (as will be discussed in the forthcoming parts of this article). This signifies that employees
of the Authority who were not identified by Ministerial Decree 8483/2006 shall not be entitled to carry out any form of inspection. See The General Instructions for
Prosecution Offices, 4th edn (Arab Republic of Egypt: Ministry of Justice, Prosecution Office, 2002), Book One—Judicial Instructions, art.315.
12Law 150 of 1950 issuing the Law on Criminal Procedures art.21 Ch.1: Judicial Enforcement Officers and their Duties.
It is worth noting that the law does not identify a specific way in which JEOs should carry out their role. Thus, JEOs are free to choose whichever method they deem
appropriate; so long as they do not fabricate the contravention themselves. See Appeal 19934 of Judicial Year 60 (Session of April 2, 1992) Egyptian Court of Cassation.
13Law 3 of 2005 Promulgating the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices art.11(1). It is worth noting that the Executive Regulations
empower the Authority to examine suspected situations without any restrictions. More precisely, art.33 provides that: “[T]he authority shall process all notifications that
are received without the need for any notice or order to carry out any examination, investigation or collection of evidence concerning any agreements and practices prejudicing
competition.”
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non-governmental authority, for the purpose
of examining those cases presented to the
authority;
2. Enter any work places or offices of those
entities subject to examination during the
official working hours, upon obtaining a
written approval from the executive officer,
as well as employ the assistance of public
authority officers, if required; and
3. Take any procedures necessary to collect
and examine the required evidence and
interrogate any entity who is suspected of
breaching the provisions of the law.14”
Apart from the basic and general stipulation of
art.38(1)—which we believe is sufficiently clear—our
reading of art.38 implies that the Authority’s JEOs are
entitled to the following:
• To make unannounced or surprise visits to
a given company’s premises; as long as this
is made within the “official working hours”
period.15
• In an event where the company does not
properly co-operate with the Authrity
and/or the latter deems the situation as
such—presume that they have validly
identified themselves upon the attempted
entry16—the Authority may request
assistance from public authority officers.
In fact, the Authority, in its Annual Report
2006–2007, has already raised this matter.
It made clear that co-ordination with the
Ministry of Interior is imminent in
situations of this sort.17
Inspection of houses of company personnel
Neither Law 3/2005 nor its Executive Regulations
regulate the inspection of properties other than a
company’s premises. However, this does not necessarily
exclude the likelihood of such procedure; given the
possibility that the Authority’s JEOs may invoke
provisions of the CPLwhich do regulate the matter.18 The
inspection of houses in general is permitted only under
very tight restrictions. This is clear from art.45 of the CPL
which provides that, “public authority officers shall not
enter any house, unless otherwise permitted by the law”.19
It is vital, however, in this respect to distinguish the rules
pertaining to the inspection of the house of a given
company’s responsiblemanager and/or employee believed
to have committed or to have been involved in the
competition-related contravention from the rules
addressing the inspection of the house of that company’s
manager and/or employee believed to have not been
involved in such contravention.20
—Inspection of houses of accused company
personnel The CPL explicitly permits the inspection
of houses conditional on the satisfaction of some
prerequisites. Article 91 provides that the:
“[I]nspection of houses is one of the procedures of
investigation and there shall not be a resort thereto
except by virtue of an order from the investigation
judge21 based on a suspicion that a person to whom
his/her house is the intended has committed a felony
or misdemeanour or assisted in committing either
of them or if there is evidence that proves that he/she
possess items which relate to the contravention. The
investigation judgemay inspect any place and papers
… and all of which may have been used in
committing the contravention or resulting from it
14 Prime Ministerial Decree 1316 of 2005 issuing the Executive Regulations of Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices Law 3 of 2005 art.38.
15 See art.38(2) of the Executive Regulations (as stipulated above).
16However, art.24(bis) of the CPL provides that violating the prerequisite that the JEO and the Public Authority officer should identify his/herself does not annul the
procedure carried out.
17 See Egyptian Competition Authority, Annual Report (2006–2007), available at http://www.eca.org.eg/ECA/upload/Publication/Attachment_E/15/annual%20report
%20english.pdf [Accessed October 20, 2009], p.41.
The Ministry of Interior identified the Public Administration for Supply and Internal Trade as the competent department in the Ministry to assist the Authority; should it
request assistance pursuant to art.38(2) of the Executive Regulations.
In the same vein, the Prosecutor-General specified the competency of the Prosecution for Financial and Commercial Affairs to investigate competition-related disputes.
The investigation may be carried out by a Chief Prosecutor. See Periodic Book No.9 of 2007 pertaining to the Application of the Rules of Law on Protection of Competition
and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices (March 25, 2007).
Furthermore, competition-related disputes are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of economic courts. See art.4 of Law 120 of 2008 Promulgating the Law Establishing
Economic Courts in Official Gazette (May 22, 2008), Vol.21 (subsequent). Note that this law came into force on October 1, 2008.
18 Some may reasonably argue that the inspection of houses of company personnel in general (i.e. whether houses of accused or other than accused personnel) in
competition-related contraventions is not a pragmatic scenario; as opposed to criminal offences. However, the relevant Egyptian laws addressing this matter—as will be
delineated below—seem to stipulate such procedure in relation to misdemeanours in generic terms (i.e. in no unequivocal terms only applicable to criminal offences). In
turn, this implies that the procedure of inspection of company personnel’s houses may not necessarily be an implausible scenario.
19Law 150 of 1950 issuing the Law on Criminal Procedures art.45.
20Note that in accordance with the general criminal rules in Egypt; only natural persons (i.e. company personnel) are criminally liable. Hence, juristic persons (i.e. companies)
are not liable for criminal acts—competition-related contraventions—except jointly with natural persons and only in respect of payment of any inflicted fines. Article 22
of Law 3/2005 criminalises the acts of natural persons; who may be a company’s marketing manager, financial manager, sales manager, executive director and/or chairperson.
Article 25 of Law 3/2005 addresses the event where the anti-competitive practice is committed by an employee other than the person responsible for management of the
company. This necessitates that the person responsible for management is aware of the contravention and that the employee commits the contravention in the name or on
behalf of the company. In Public Prosecution v National Cement Co & Others, while nine companies were convicted over price-fixing and limiting production, 20 of these
companies’ personnel were criminally liable; all of which rested on their involvement in such practices (or awareness of such contraventions in the case of personnel
responsible for management). Among those 20 personnel were nine of the management team of each company (responsible managers, chief executive officers or chairmen)
and the remaining 11 personnel were the managers/employees involved in the cartel. SeeMisdemeanours Nasr City (2900/2008) August 25, 2008 Court of First Instance.
Note that this judgment was upheld on appeal; making it the first case to be finalised under Egyptian Competition Law with positive findings until current. See appeal in
East Cairo (22622/2008).
21 “Investigation judge” is a term that was used in the early stages of enforcement of the CPL (1950s). Investigation judges share the same characteristics as prosecutors in
terms of role. Nowadays, there is no existence to the terminology “investigation judge”; whether in theory or practice. It is the competent prosecutor in question who takes
charge of the procedure of investigation. For more detail, see M.M. Salama, Al-Igraat Al-Ginaiah Fi Al-Tashrea Al-Masry (Criminal Procedures in Egyptian Legislation)
(Dar El-Nahda El-Arabia [book in Arabic], 2001), Pt 1, pp.180–181.
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along with all what is beneficial for disclosing facts.
In all circumstances, the inspection order shall be
reasoned.”22
Given that art.11 of Law 169 of 1981 amending some of
the rules of Penal Law 58 of 1937 provides that fines
where maximum amounts exceed 100 Egyptian pounds
shall be considered misdemeanours, and while art.22 of
Law 190 of 2008 amending some of the provisions of the
Law 3 of 2005 provides that:
“the breach of any of the provision of Articles 6, 7
and 8 of this law shall be sanctioned by a fine not
less than one hundred thousand Egyptian pounds
and not exceeding three hundred million Egyptian
pounds,”23
one may observe that contraventions to any of the terms
of arts 6, 7 and 8 of the Law 3/2005 are sufficient for the
issuance of judicial orders for the inspection of houses
per se.24
Although art.91 of the CPL provides that houses shall
not be entered or inspected except by a reasoned judicial
order, they do not regulate the level of reasoning adequate
to satisfy such pre-requisite.25Clearly this is an equivocal
part to which the CPL did not elaborate. Article 320 of
the GIPO, however, emphasises that the reasoning of
judicial orders should identify the nature of the
contravention, the evidence on which it is based and must
be conclusive in terms of nature.26
To ensure legitimacy of the procedure itself and,
perhaps, with a view to avoiding any hindrance to the
credibility of the evidence resulting from the inspection,
the CPL provides for some procedures to be put in place.
More specifically, art.51 states that:
“[I]nspection shall take place with attendance of the
accused person or a person who represents him/her;
otherwise it shall be carried out with attendance of
two witnesses.”27
The CPL, indispensably, regulates the event where the
accused person possesses sealed documents and whether
or not the inspecting JEOs are entitled to unseal them.
Article 52 provides that:
“[I]f the house of the accused person contains sealed
documents or documents closed up in any other way,
the judicial enforcement officer shall not unseal
them.”28
This signifies that the Authority’s JEOs are only entitled
to gain access to documents that are not sealed by any
means.
Moreover, art.55 of the CPL provides that:
“[J]udicial enforcement officers shall detain the
papers … and all of which may have been used in
committing the contravention or resulted from its
execution or have been based on it and all what is
beneficial for disclosing the facts. The mentioned
shall then be supplied to the accused person for
his/her remarks and a summons shall be written on
this and the accused person shall be asked to sign it
or otherwise it shall indicate his/her refusal to sign.”29
Indeed one assumes that the application of art.55 shall be
without prejudice to art.52 of the CPL; otherwise the
procedure of detaining the relevant documents pursuant
to art.55 will consequently be deemed as void. This is
based on a well-established procedural principle which
provides that when evidence is based on or extracted from
a void procedure, it becomes subsequently void.30
To put the aforementioned rules on inspection of
houses more into a competition-law perspective, the
Authority’s JEOs may—upon obtaining a reasoned
judicial order from the competent prosecutor—inspect
the house of a company’s responsible manager and/or
employee acting in the name or on behalf of the company
and believed to have committed or to have been involved
in a given competition-law contravention in the presence
of any of the following events:
22Law 150 of 1950 issuing the Law on Criminal Procedures, art.91.
Note that this article represents one of the amendments incorporated by the Law 37 of 1972 amending some of the provisions of the Law 150 of 1950 issuing the Law on
Criminal Procedures.
It is worth noting that art.91 (as such) was initially drafted to comply with art.44 of the Egyptian Constitution which provides that, “for privacy purposes, houses shall not
be entered or inspected except with a reasoned judicial order issued in accordance with the law”. Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, published in the Official
Gazette on September 12, 1971.
By contrast to the procedure of the inspection of houses, the procedure of gathering information and evidence may be carried out by JEOs prior to/without any judicial
orders. See Appeal No.10553 of Judicial Year 61 (Session dated April 7, 1993) Egyptian Court of Cassation.
23Law 190 of 2008 amending some of the provisions of the Law 3 of 2005 on the Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices art.22, Official
Gazette 25bis(a), June 22, 2008.
Note that arts 6, 7 and 8 of the Law 3 of 2005 prohibit horizontal agreements (ex agreements between competitors) which are anti-competitive, vertical agreements (ex
agreement between producer and distributer or wholesaler) which are restrictive of competition and abuse of dominance practices respectively.
24 Presidential Decree of the Law 169 of 1981 Amending some of the rules of the Penal Law 58 of 1937 art.11, Official Gazette 44(bis), November 4, 1981.
25 It should be noted that the decision of whether or not to issue a judicial order, in the first place, is subject to the discretionary power of the investigating authority (i.e.
competent prosecutor) scrutinised thereafter by the court of the subject matter. This usually depends on the seriousness and credibility of the preceding procedure (gathering
evidence and information) as carried out by the JEO. See Appeal No.21148 of Judicial Year 64 (Session dated April 22, 1997) Egyptian Court of Cassation.
26The General Instructions for Prosecution Offices, 4th edn (Judicial Instructions, Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Justice, Prosecution Office, 2002), Book 1, art.320.
27Law 150 of 1950 issuing the Law on Criminal Procedures, art.51.
28Law 150 of 1950 issuing the Law on Criminal Procedures, art.52.
29Law 150 of 1950 issuing the Law on Criminal Procedures, art.55. It may be worth adding that art.59 of the CPL provides that, in the event where the captured papers
provide to the person where they were captured, a compelling interest, an approved copy of them shall be handed to him or her.
30For instance, the Egyptian Court of Cassation held that while the procedure of inspection was in itself void, all evidences extracted shall not be contemplated. See Appeal
No.6858 of Judicial Year 53 (Session dated April 18, 1984) Egyptian Court of Cassation.
Even more interestingly, the Court of Cassation voids judgments on the basis of a void procedure. See Appeal No.410 of Judicial Year 56 (Session dated December 12,
1991) Egyptian Court of Cassation.
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• where there is a suspicion that his/her
company contravened any of the terms of
arts 6, 7 or 8 of the Law 3/2005 or even
participated in contravening them;
• where there is evidence that proves that
he/she possess documents which relate to
a contravention to any of the terms of arts
6, 7 or 8 of the Law 3/2005.
—Inspection of houses other than that of the
accused company personnel The law, under tighter
prerequisites than the preceding category, permits the
inspection of houses of companies’ personnel believed
to have not been involved in a competition-law
contravention, i.e. inspection of the house other than the
accused person’s, as the CPL may term. Article 206 of
the CPL provides that the:
“[I]nspection shall not be carried out by the public
prosecution … in a house other than the accused
person’s unless recognised that he/she possess items
which relate to a contravention.”31
Article 330 of the GIPO adds to this that a procedure as
such shall not be carried out except by obtaining a
reasoned order from the competent judge who issues it
following a review of the documents of the case.32
Despite the fact that art.206 specifically empowers a
member of the public prosecution to implement this
procedure, i.e. with no explicit reference to JEOs, this
does not necessarily mean that they are not entitled to
undertake such procedure. This is because art.200 of the
CPL provides that members of the public prosecution
may assign JEOs to carry out some of their roles in the
investigation process.
This may mean that the Authority’s JEOs may, having
obtained evidence that one of a given company’s
managers and/or employees believed to have not been
involved in the contravention in question possesses
documents which prove that the company exercises
anti-competitive practices, ask the competent prosecutor
to request an inspection order from the judge in
jurisdiction in accordance with art.206 of the CPL.
However, in the event where the investigation process
is carried out by a chief prosecutor, the judicial order may
be issued directly by the public prosecution. In other
words, the public prosecution may not need to refer the
matter to the judge in jurisdiction. The chief prosecutor
may, after issuing the inspection order, assign the
Authority’s JEOs to carry out such procedure.
To recap, the Authority’s JEOs may—upon obtaining
a reasoned judicial order from the judge in jurisdiction
through the competent prosecutor (unless investigation
is carried out by a chief prosecutor) and provided that the
latter assigns them to carry out such a procedure—inspect
the house of a company’s manager and/or employee
believed not to have been involved in the contravention
at stake. This is conditional on the understanding that
he/she possess documents which relate to a contravention
to any of the terms of arts 6, 7 or 8 of Law 3/2005.
Legal privilege
The concept of legal privilege—whether in relation to
the documents and correspondences provided to the
company by its legal department or vice versa; or those
provided to the company by its external consultant or vice
versa—is neither regulated under the Law 3/2005 nor its
Executive Regulations. This matter rather gains attention
under the BAL, the CPL and, in some respects, the GIPO.
This part will distinguish between two situations: external
consultancy and legal-department consultancy.
External consultancy
At the outset, it is important to determine whether or not
a JEO is entitled to inspect the office of a given
company’s external consultant. Article 313 of the GIPO,
while defining the scope of houses for the purposes of
inspections, addressed the rules pertaining to lawyers’
offices. It provides that:
“[T]he house is every private place which
accommodates a person whether it is on a permanent
or temporary basis … Private places shall extend to
those places where a person resides; even though
for a limited period throughout the day; such as …
a lawyer’s office.”33
In this sense, art.313 may imply that an office of lawyers
shares the same rules of inspection as that of the houses
of accused personnel (see the section on “Inspection of
houses of accused company personnel” in this article). It
is indeed assumed that the office of a company’s external
consultant amounts to the meaning of a “lawyer’s office”
stipulated under art.313. However, this requires providing
a definition for the term “lawyer” under the relevant laws
and regulations. According to art.2 of the BAL, any
person who is listed under the Egyptian Lawyers’ Chart
shall be named as a “mohamy”, i.e. “lawyer”.34 On this
basis, art.313 of the GIPO shall not be applicable to the
office of an external consultant of a given company unless
its managing partner or responsible manager is listed
under the Lawyers’ Chart.
The difference, however, between the procedures
pertaining to the inspection of houses of companies’
personnel believed to have committed or to have been
involved in a contravention and those regarding a lawyer’s
office is as art.51 of the BAL provides:
31Law 150 of 1950 issuing the Law on Criminal Procedures art.206. This article represents one of the amendments incorporated by the Law 37 of 1972.
32The General Instructions for Prosecution Offices, 4th edn (Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Justice, Prosecution Office, 2002) Book 1—Judicial Instructions, art.330.
33The General Instructions for Prosecution Offices, 2002, art.313.
34 See Law 17 of 1983 issuing the Law on Bar Association Law art.2, Official Gazette 13, March 31, 1983.
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“[I]t is not permitted to interrogate a lawyer or
inspect his/her office except by one of the members
of the public prosecution.35 The Public Prosecution
shall notify the Sub-Divisional Bar Association
Committee prior to investigating any complaint
against a lawyer. The chief of the Sub-Divisional
Bar Association Committee or whoever represents
him/her shall attend the investigation process36 in
the event where the lawyer is accused of committing
a … misdemeanour in relation to his/her work.”37
Article 51 of the BAL as such raises the debate over the
applicability of art.200 of the CPL—permitting the
assignment of JEOs to some of the roles of the competent
prosecutor. In other words, are the Authority’s JEOs
entitled to inspect the office of a company’s external
consultant by virtue of an assignment by the competent
prosecutor in application to art.200 of the CPL?
Thewording of art.51 seems to exclude the competence
of JEOs in this respect. Otherwise, it would have added,
“unless otherwise permitted by other laws and
regulations”. However, the author believes that there is
no reason to exclude the possibility where the competent
prosecutor may request from the Authority’s JEOs—who
are initially handling the matter—to accompany him in
such procedure. Thus, the Authority’s JEOs are not
entitled to inspect the office of a company’s external
consultant without the competent prosecutor’s request to
accompany him in such procedure. In other words, the
Authority’s JEOs are not entitled to undergo this form of
inspection on their own.
Having established that JEOs are not entitled to inspect
the office of a company’s external consultant voluntarily,
we shall then move to the accessibility of the
documents/correspondences provided by a company to
its external consultant or vice versa. Article 96 of the CPL
provides that:
“[T]he investigation judge shall not gain access to
the papers and documents in the possession of the
lawyer or expertise consultant provided by the
accused [client] to carry out the assigned work, as
well as to the exchanged correspondences between
them in relation to the case.”38
Article 96 as such clearly demonstrates that the competent
prosecutor is not entitled to access documents or
correspondences provided to a lawyer by his/her client.
On this basis, one may imply that while a competent
prosecutor, in his capacity as the chief of the judicial
enforcement process is not empowered to such level,39
the Authority’s JEOs a priori shall not be entitled to such
procedure.
In-house consultancy
Article 3(4) para.2 of the BAL recognises a given
company’s in-house legal department as one of the
categories of consultancy. Hence, any person employed
in the legal department and listed under the Lawyers’
Chart, pursuant to art.2 of the BAL, shall be named as a
“lawyer”.40 However, there are no explicit rules on
in-house consultancy under the BAL. This may, at first
sight, signify that such category of consultancy is subject
to the rules stipulated under Law 3/2005 and its Executive
Regulations. One may, nonetheless, distinguish between
two events in this respect.
The first event assumes that the legal department is
located at the company’s business premises; or otherwise
shares the same premises with the company itself. In this
circumstance, the legal department may be contemplated
as part of the company—in which case the Authority’s
JEOs are entitled to the powers of inspection of a
company’s premises, as stipulated under art.38 of the
Executive Regulations and discussed earlier under
“Inspection of the company’s premises” of this article
(i.e. make unannounced visits in official hours, review
documents, etc.).
The second event presupposes that the legal department
is located at different premises than that of the company’s
business premises. Debate may arise particularly in this
event. While, on the one hand, the Authority’s JEOs may
invoke arts 11(1) and 38 of Law 3/2005 and its Executive
Regulations respectively to argue that the legal
department, despite not sharing the same premises with
the company’s business, remains part of the company
and should thus be subject to the same inspection
procedures, the company’s legal department, on the other
hand, may invoke the terms of art.96 of the CPL to decline
access to the company’s documents in its possession.
Depending on the success in invoking art.96, the
inspection of the legal department’s office in such event
may be subject to the same rules of an external
consultant’s office (i.e. in resemblance to the procedures
discussed in the section on “External consultancy” in this
article).
As for the accessibility of correspondences/documents
communicated by external counsels to the companywhich
may be found by the Authority at the business premises,
Egyptian laws and regulations do not directly address this
matter. Article 96 of the CPL only prohibits the
Authority’s JEOs from gaining access to
documents/correspondences in the possession of a
company’s external consultant (i.e. no statement to the
vice versa event). On this basis, one may observe that
this restriction may not extend to the
35Note that art.586 of the GIPO indicates that the investigation process with lawyers—which indeed includes inspection of their offices—shall be carried out by the most
senior member of the competent public-prosecution office.
36Note that inspections usually constitute part of the investigation process.
37BAL art.51.
38Law 150 of 1950 issuing the Law on Criminal Procedures art.96. Needless to mention that art.65 of the BAL provides that, “the lawyer shall refrain from performing a
witness on the events or information which comes to his/her knowledge through the profession”.
39 It is worth noting that the capacity of a prosecutor as the chief of the judicial enforcement process is a well-known custom in criminal proceedings in Egypt. This is also
implied from art.200 of the CPL which provides that members of the public prosecution may assign any JEO to carry out some of his roles in the investigation process.
40 See arts 2, 3(4) para.2 of Law 17 of 1983 issuing the Law on Bar Association Law, Official Gazette 13, March 31, 1983.
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documents/correspondences provided by the external
consultant to the company. This, hence, means that legal
privilege may not be applicable to this latter case.41
Conclusion
The Egyptian system clearly lacks transparency in respect
of the Authority’s investigative powers pertaining to the
enforcement of competition law and regulation. In fact,
the Authority shows no intention of going into detail on
procedural aspects as such (i.e. how it gathered
documentation/correspondences from the company under
investigation) in any of its future reports.
Moreover, the Egyptian competition-law regime does
not seem to address all procedural aspects on this matter.
This becomes specifically evident from the fact that the
procedures pertaining to the inspection of properties other
than the company’s and the issue of legal privilege were
neither tackled by Law 3/2005 nor its Executive
Regulations. The only transparent matter in this respect
is where art.38 of the Executive Regulations sets out the
Authority’s powers to inspect business premises (review
books and documents, enter work places in working
hours, etc.).
To sum up this article, the Authority’s JEOs are only
entitled to the following procedures:
• making unannounced visits to a company’s
premises within the official working hours
and gaining access to documents and
correspondences. This includes the legal
department—arguably as long as it shares
the same premises with that of the business
one;
• requesting assistance from public-authority
officers in case of a declined entry to the
premises;
• following the issuance of a reasoned
judicial order by the competent prosecutor,
the inspection of the house of a company’s
personnel believed to have committed or
to have been involved in the
competition-related contravention. This
category of inspection, however, requires
the existence of either of two events:
— where there is suspicion that the
personnel in question contravened
any of the terms of arts 6, 7 or 8
of Law 3/2005 or even
participated in contravening them;
— where there is evidence that
proves that he/she possesses
documents which relate to a
contravention to any of the terms
of arts 6, 7 or 8 of Law 3/2005;
• upon obtaining a reasoned judicial order
from the judge in jurisdiction through the
competent prosecutor—provided that the
latter assigns them to such task—inspecting
the house of any of the company’s
managers or employees believed to have
not been involved in the contravention42;
conditional on the recognition that he/she
possess documents which relate to a
contravention to any of the terms of arts 6,
7 or 8 of Law 3/2005. However, the judicial
order may be issued directly by the public
prosecution in jurisdiction where the
investigation is carried out by a chief
prosecutor; in which case the latter may
assign the Authority’s JEOs to undertake
such procedure.
41Note that following completion of inspection, collection of information and inquiry procedure, the competent department in the Authority shall submit a report to its
Executive Director who refers the complaint to the Board of Directors accompanied by his opinion. The Authority’s Board of Directors then decides whether or not to refer
the matter to the competent Minister. For more information on procedural aspects, see arts 33–43 of the Executive Regulations.
It is, furthermore, important to note that the criminal case pertaining to competition-law contraventions is never filed by the Authority itself. The Authority rather refers its
report to the competent Minister who may in turn refer it the public prosecution for investigation.
42Recall, however, that it suffices for a company’s responsible manager to be aware of the competition-law contravention for him/her to be held as criminally liable, pursuant
to art.25 of Law 3/2005. In other words, if the company manager responsible is aware of the contravention—a plausible scenario—he or she shall be held as criminally
liable and thus, be classified under Criminal Procedures Rules as an “accused person”. In this event, the procedures on inspection of the houses of accused company personnel
shall be followed.
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